All countries, including Turkey, participating in the WTO believe that there has been some economic benefit in adopting the WTO agreements; however, there is considerable disagreement as to how much benefit the agreements have actually produced. A study by the University
of Michigan found that if all trade barriers in agriculture, services, and manufactures
were reduced by 33% as a result of the Doha Development Agenda, there would be
an increase in global welfare of $574.0 billion. A 2008 study by World Bank Lead
Economist Kym Anderson found that global income could increase by more than $300
billion per year, $250 billion of which would go to the developing world. Others
had been predicting more modest outcomes, e.g. world net welfare gains ranging
from $84 billion to $287 billion by the year 2015.
Corruption in customs as one of the trade barriers which act as an additional tax or fee impedes the free trade; therefore causes huge losses of share
that the developing countries would have in benefits of international trade. If
Anderson’s above mentioned estimate is true, basically we might content that
250 billion USD gets less and less at every corruption case occurring in the
customs of developing countries.
Corruption
also causes inefficiency in business having bad impact on international trade.
When the customs officials harass firms with demand of bribery, firms spend human
and monetary resources resulting in inflation of labor and operational costs. This
problem is even worse for small and medium enterprises as the bribe amounts
that they have to pay at customs might substantially affect their capacity to
do business across borders. Even if my main focus is in Turkey, I think developing countries where corruption in customs is widespread share similar features with regards to main reasons of corruption and strategies to combat against it. In my opinion in order for the efforts to combat
against corruption in customs to be effective we need an integrity and ethical
government oriented approach to the problem. Ethical government requires all
the powers – legislature, bureaucracy and judiciary – to act in conformity with
ethical principles. An ethics system that excludes one of these powers or
branches of government is ready to collapse any time; thus preventing our
chance to make improvement in this fight. Only a comprehensive reform process
starting from the restructuring of customs administration can break countries
out of existing vicious circles linking corruption and under-development. In
order to achieve that, we need to be reformist. In order to achieve this, we
need strong intent of highest ranking administrators in our case, i.e. Minister
of Trade and Customs- to eliminate all kinds of corruption and inefficiency at
customs because attitudes, perceptions, and actions of them are fundamental to any
efforts to initiate and sustain reform. High ranking administrators have to
take determined positions against corruption to be models of integrity for low
ranking officials who work at the heart of operations. Second, what we need is
not partial projects targeting specific areas of customs like computerization or
modernization projects. What we need in Turkey and other developing countries
where corruption is widespread, is a more revolutionary approach which is
restructuring the customs administration. First, we need to change our
perception about corruption which will be conducted through training programs
for customs officials, seminars for firm representatives doing business across
the border, conferences for raising awareness of society that corruption is an
epidemic, not a right, tax or usual course of business.
Second, we need
to build a very clear and standardized procedural system through concise and
accessible legislation, eliminating all grey areas that cause opportunities of corruption.
Third, we need to make sure that if a customs official violates his ethical and
criminal obligations under codes of conduct at various laws defining
corruption, the penalty system is applied to everyone equally and strictly
without any exemptions or exceptions. With regard to corruption investigations
carried out by the Turkish Inspection Boards, the need for a prior
authorization from the hierarchy when investigating some categories of public
officials hampers the investigation. There is an urgent need for better co-ordination
of the system currently in place for combating corruption. The designation of a
body with sufficient independence responsible for promulgating and monitoring
the implementation of anti-corruption measures could be helpful in this
respect. Also in Turkey, asset disclosure records of customs officials are
unavailable to the public and whistle-blower protections are virtually non-existent.
Journalists investigating corruption face intimidation and harassment with one
fatality occurring over the reporting period.
A recent
empirical study on corruption at customs of Bolivia, Pakistan, and Philippine
might be taken as an example of methods for eliminating corruption at customs
because each one of the countries are highly different from each other and they
carry some similar features with Turkey in sense of international trade and development.
The study shows
that the strategies based on repression and positive incentives are effective
in regulating a situation of low corruption and preventing its further development
but experience shows that these tools cannot correct a situation of widespread
corruption. Therefore, I advise, restructuring of the procedures that leads to an
important reduction of the opportunities of corruption should be at the core of
the strategy. Furthermore a high degree of transparency in design and
implementation should be maintained. Obtaining the active support of groups benefiting
from reform, proceeding step by step, combining restructuring with changes in
management, monitoring implementation and securing computer systems are also
crucial for the comprehensive reform. Above all, as I have mentioned before
political will remains key for a successful implementation. The case studies
showed that it is crucial to have strong commitments on the part of both
political leaders and the customs director.